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ABSTRACT 
This paper describes a smart grid test bed comprising embedded 
generation, phasor measurement units (PMUs), and supporting ICT 
components and infrastructure. The test bed enables the 
development of a use case focused on a synchronous islanding 
scenario, where the embedded generation becomes islanded from 
the mains supply. Due to the provisioned control components, 
control strategy, and best-practice ICT support infrastructure, the 
islanded portion of the grid is able to continue to operate in a secure 
and dependable manner.  
CCS Concepts 
• Computer systems organization → Embedded and cyber-
physical systems → Sensors and actuators • Security and 
privacy → Systems security • Hardware → Power and energy.  
Keywords 
Testbed; Smart Grid; secure control; microgrid; synchronous-
islanding 
1. INTRODUCTION 
‘Smart Grid’ is a wide encompassing term, but applications falling 
into this category generally refer to the application of modern 
Information Communication Technology (ICT) to solve challenges 
and constraints in the operation of traditional electrical energy 
infrastructure.  Whilst there are many decades of experience of the 
application of ICT at transmission system voltages, where there 
was a clear business case for dedicated utility own 
communications, there is now momentum behind the application of 
such applications at lower distribution level voltages.  At these 
voltage levels, the business case for dedicated communications is 
not clear, and it is generally necessary to make use of public 
telecoms infrastructure. While these novel methodologies are 
needed to allow existing infrastructure to fulfill a changing role, the 
operation of critical control algorithms on ICT infrastructure, and 
in particular public ICT infrastructure, introduces the risk of cyber-
attacks that can cause physical damage.  
The relationship between the traditional safety domain and the 
cyber security domain is a major challenge for the acceptance of 
‘smart grid’ solutions. It is a challenge that cannot be sufficiently 
addressed by the necessary application of existing solutions from 
either domain [13]. In the CAPRICA project the authors investigate 
how control algorithms can be designed to be resilient in the face 
of cyber-attacks. Further, the authors develop ICT solutions that 
make use of the best practice in the traditional ICT domain. 
Of particular interest to electrical energy networks at present, 
notably across Europe and in particular the authors’ home network 
on the island of Ireland, is the issue of the integration of renewable 
electricity generation.  At the time of writing, the all-Ireland power 
system frequently meets demand with as much as 50% of supply 
coming from non-synchronous machine generators, predominately 
made up of wind generation [1].  The issues that arise, including 
reduction in system inertia and changing fault levels, was not 
foreseen when the architecture of the electrical infrastructure was 
designed in the 1950s/60s/70s when centralize bulk generators 
supplied by fossil fuels was the norm.  Hence, there is a requirement 
for novel methods of power system operation to enable the system 
to function with this and higher levels of system non-synchronous 
penetration (SNSP). 
The authors’ have an interested in a state of power system operation 
known as ‘synchronous islanding’ [2].  Conventionally, power 
system islanding is a mode of operation to be avoided, as is the case 
in the authors’ complimentary research work in islanding 
protection [3].  However when an island is  appropriately 
controlled, the dangers of uncontrolled islanding are avoided and 
there is a benefit to the utility in terms of reduction in customer 
minutes lost, and generation is kept online avoiding the need for it 
to be disconnected, shut down, and restarted. 
In this paper the authors present a physical electrical system 
testbed, representing a microgrid containing embedded generation, 
that has been built at Queen’s University Belfast (QUB).  The 
testbed was originally constructed to demonstrate the feasibility of 
synchronous islanding of a single machine, then adapted for multi-
machine islanding, and then again to create a testbed on which to 
investigate the interdisciplinary domain of cyber-secure industrial 
control systems (see Section 2). The authors will describe the 
detailed testbed setup in Section 3 together with possible 
cooperation opportunities. Section 4 will highlight the authors’ 
current research that is performed on the testbed before concluding 
the paper in Section 5. 
2. THE USE CASE 
Due to the geographical location of the resource, large scale 
renewable electricity sources are predominantly located in isolated 
areas.  This presents a challenge to the successful integration of 
renewable electricity generators, since such remote areas tend to be 
weakly electrically connected.  That is there is no access to the bulk 
transmission grid, rather power must be transferred at lower 
voltages across the distribution network.  Issues arise including that 
of voltage rise, power quality and flicker, and constraints and 
bottlenecks caused by the capacity of the infrastructure to 
accommodate reverse power flows.  Amongst these challenges is 
the issue of islanding. 
Islanding is the scenario in which an embedded generator (that is, 
a small generator connected to the distribution network) finds itself 
operating without connection to bulk utility dispatched generation.  
This is often caused be a fault upstream of the generator being 
cleared (disconnected) by the correct operation of protection 
systems (circuit breakers open).  See Figure 1. When a generator 
operates in an island, there is the possibility for it to supply utility 
customers outside of the generator owner’s premises.  This presents 
a risk to the other customers due to lack of regulation of voltage 
and frequency, a risk to utility personnel restoring the fault (who 
would assume the downstream side to be de-energized) and risks 
the destruction of the embedded generator is reconnection is made 
out of synchronism with the mains supply.  
A generator must be connected to the mains under a process called 
‘synchronization’, during which the voltage of the generator is 
matched to that of the mains, the frequency is matched to that of 
the mains, and the phase angle of the voltage is matched to that of 
the mains.  Should any of these properties be incorrect, the 
generator cannot synchronize due to risks of severe damage to the 
equipment and personnel safety.  For these reasons, islanding is 
forbidden on most systems. 
 
Figure 1: Example Islanding Scenario 
The incumbent forms of islanding detection in use today are Rate-
of-Change-of-Frequency (ROCOF) and Vector Shift.  A thorough 
technical description of these technologies is outside the scope of 
this paper, but in summary these technologies are no longer fit to 
serve on modern grids.  Both technologies were designed for use 
on grids with low penetrations of embedded generation, and known 
deficiencies that could lead to nuisance tripping (that is, 
disconnecting a generator when there was no need to) had virtually 
no impact on the wider system.  In the present day, the widespread 
use of embedded generation means that these technologies must be 
desensitized otherwise nuisance tripping would be frequent, and the 
potential for one nuisance trip to cause further ‘cascade tripping’ 
and loss of system supply is now of concern.  Consequently, novel 
methods of determining when a generator has become disconnect 
from the mains (known as ‘loss-of-mains’ or islanding) is an active 
research domain [3]. 
A contrary viewpoint to disconnecting a generator once islanding 
has been identified is that if one were to control the generator so 
that it was held artificially in synchronism with the utility grid, then 
the risks of out-of-synchronism reconnection of the generator are 
mitigated.  Issues of power quality are intrinsically addressed, and 
those of personnel safety would be resolved through staff training. 
Synchronous islanding is made possible by the application of time 
synchronized phasor measurements, known as synchrophasors.  A 
phasor represents the amplitude, frequency and phase angle of a 
voltage or current on a power system.  Synchrophasors are phasors 
acquired by a device disciplined to the UTC timebase (typically 
using a GPS receiver), such that measurements can be taken over a 
wide geographical area and then usefully compared. 
In a synchronous island, the embedded generator operates a control 
loop to match the properties of a phasor acquired at the generator 
terminals to a phasor representing a reference location.  A suitable 
reference location would be a highly interconnect substation. 
Prior work has considered the physical aspects of the synchronous 
islanding problem, and identified useful technical design 
parameters.  For example, the system shall fail if the phase angle 
diverges beyond 60 [4], or if the telecoms delay becomes longer 
than 300ms [2]. 
A current parallel activity is investigating a physical demonstration 
of multi-generator synchronous islanding, which necessitates a 
further supervisory control loop with telecommunication between 
generators.  This was previous presented as a simulation exercise 
[5], where the ICT was considered ideal to allow emphasis on the 
physical challenge.  The physical demonstrator must address the 
role of ICT. 
The quality of the phasor measurements themselves are important 
which has prompted the authors to develop their own phasor 
measurement unit.  The original version of this work has been open 
sourced with further details in [7].  A new version, which has been 
constructed in a modular manner specifically to enable 
interdisciplinary collaboration, is in the final stages of 
development.  This new version the OpenPMU is split into three 
modules; data acquisition, signal processing, and 
telecommunications.  This allows subject experts to contribute to 
their module, with a simple API between each module. This yields 
a technology platform that is highly suitable to develop further 
‘smart grid’ applications in addition to the PMU function.  
In this work, it is important to consider that the present standard 
governing PMU telecommunications, IEEE Std. C37.118.2 [6] 
provides no intrinsic security mechanisms, instead passing 
responsibility for security to the network.  The modular design of 
the PMU used in this work allows state-of-the-art security 
mechanisms to be designed intrinsically into the measurement 
technology. 
This work investigates the link between the cyber domain and the 
physical domain.  High quality measurement technology allows 
measurement error to be discounted so that small signal analysis of 
control loop response can yield information as to the state-of-health 
of the telecoms network, potentially providing a mechanism to 
identify unauthorized intrusion or manipulation of the sensor data.  
To investigate these challenges, the authors have implemented a 
testbed that allows for the evaluation of novel control algorithms 
for various Smart Grid use cases from a control and an ICT 
perspective. Currently the authors are focusing on the synchronous 
islanding problem but the capabilities of the testbed are not limited 
to this use case. 
3. TESTBED DESCRIPTION 
The laboratory setup consists of one load bank, two generator sets, 
a transmission line model, two synchrophasor measurement units 
(which can be standard commercial equipment or they could be 
OpenPMUs described in [6])  and a tie to the main utility grid. A 
simplified schematic is shown in Figure 2. One of the 
synchrophasor measurement units is connected to the islanded area, 
and the other to the main utility grid providing a reference angle for 
the controller of the islanded area to steer the islanded area towards. 
Alternatively one could skip the main utility grid synchrophasor 
unit and provide a stream of historical synchrophasor 
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measurements that would act as the reference for the setup. Figure 
3 shows an overview of the laboratory setup.  
The laboratory test setup contains two generator sets which will be 
used to mimic the behaviour of hydro-electric generation. These 
generator sets are built by Scott & CO. A 7.5 bhp 1500 RPM DC 
machine acts as the turbine providing mechanical torque, coupled 
to a 3 phase 5 kVA 2 pole pair synchronous machine acting as the 
generator.  
 
Figure 2: Schematic of laboratory setup of single machine 
synchronous island 
The generator sets have two main ways of providing controllability 
to the laboratory setup; adjusting the torque provided by the DC 
machine effectively changing the active power output of the 
generator and controlling the excitation current in the synchronous 
machine which will lead a change of reactive power produced or 
drawn by the generator. 
In order to control the generator sets in the laboratory environment 
a mini-computer, a Raspberry Pi [9], is provisioned to act as a 
controller for each set (Fig.  4). The Raspberry Pi functions as the 
turbine governor and the automatic voltage regulator, controlling 
the torque of the generator set. It controls the generator set in such 
a way that the response  mimics the response of the power plant it 
represents, in this case a hydro power plant. 
The authors have chosen to add a Pulse Width Modulation (PWM) 
add-on card to the Raspberry Pi to allow the control of both the 
‘Eurotherm DC machine controller’ and the excitation current for 
the synchronous machine. The ‘Eurotherm DC machine controller’ 
requires a smooth voltage input from 0-10 V in order to function 
correctly so a simple operation amplifier low pass filer circuit was 
required to smoothen out the PWM signal generated by the 
Raspberry Pi add-on card. The operation amplifier also amplifies 
the voltage by two effectively increasing the output voltage from 0-
5 V to 0-10 V. 
In order to control the generator shown in Figure 3 a hardware 
controller was built. The hardware controller utilizes a ‘Raspberry 
Pi 2’ as the main computation unit and a micro controller, the 
Teensy 3.2 [8], as an input/output device that allows the Raspberry 
Pi to send set-point adjustments to the generator and receive 
feedback required by the automatic voltage regulator. The 
Raspberry Pi runs a Python code that controls the generator set such 
that the generator set mimics the operation of a hydro-electric 
generator set. This is implemented using time constants to the 
control input providing the generator set with longer response time. 
 
Figure 3: Overview of controller implementation 
4. A MODULARIZED PMU 
It has been found that present commercially available PMU 
equipment has unsatisfactory performance.  The development of 
novel real-time control in this work is reliant on the quality of the 
sensing and feedback apparatus.  It was identified early in the work 
that it would be necessary for the authors to build upon their 
existing work on the ‘OpenPMU’ and produce a high quality 
instrument. The authors’ have modularized the functions of the 
OpenPMU into three major distinct functions.  These are data 
acquisition, signal processing, and data representation 
(telecommunications), as depicted in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4: The major components of the OpenPMU system 
By modularizing the functions of a PMU, this allows subject 
experts to focus their efforts on the area of PMU technology to 
which they can best contribute.  The data acquisition stage requires 
a subject expert in ADC devices, hard-real-time programming 
environments and time transfer.  The signal processing stage is 
essentially a mathematical problem that can be offloaded to a 
powerful CPU; subject experts in phase estimation algorithms can 
apply their expertise here.  The telecoms component requires a 
subject expert in network communications, historians/databases 
and security. 
The interface between each module is achieved using XML 
datagrams, transmitted by UDP.  When two functions appear on the 
same machine, the operating system’s local loopback address is 
used.  All data is presented with human readable tags, and in ASCII 
format.  This is bandwidth inefficient, but allows for extensive 
interoperability and reduces the learning curve for new 
contributors.  Bandwidth efficient can be improved by adopting 
JSON in favor of XML.  An example of a datagram containing raw 
waveform sample data is presented in Figure 5.  The waveform was 
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acquired at 12.8 kHz, 16-bits, then formatted into Base64.  This 
section shows 10 ms worth of sample data. 
 
Figure 5: Example XML Datagram 
This modular platform has potential as a Smart Grid development 
platform beyond PMU devices, with applications in Smart 
Metering, Demand Side Management and Power Quality in 
development. 
4.1 Secure Communication Framework 
To ensure secure and reliable communication, the developed 
communication framework is based on IEC 61850-90-5 [10]. The 
protocol stack for IEC 61850-90-5 standard is depicted in Figure 6 
that highlights it evolution from substation automation standard 
i.e., IEC 61850. The synchrophasor measurements are transmitted 
using Sampled Values (SV). SV is a stream based messaging 
protocol designed for high speed sharing of information across the 
system for time-critical applications.  
 
Figure 6: Protocol stack of IEC 61850-90-5 
The SV messages are protected by a security mechanism known as 
Group Domain of Interpretation (GDOI) [11]. GDOI provides 
enhanced security and protection against man-in-the-middle, 
connection hijacking, replay, reflection and denial-of-service 
attacks. It is a group key management protocol that relies on 
ISAKMP for secure authentication of communicating peers over an 
insecure wide-area network. The key establishment mechanism of 
our communication framework is based on Diffie Hellman 
exchange which is one of the most successful protocol for public 
key cryptography [12]. The GDOI mechanism assigns Security 
Association (SA) to communicating peers based on information 
stream, destination Ethernet or IP address and content/service type. 
Further, each SA has a certain validity and is refreshed periodically 
to achieve best possible protection against cryptanalysis. IEC 
61850-90-5 along with the distinguishing features of GDOI makes 
it the well suited communication framework for protecting the 
critical infrastructure involved in the synchrophasor applications.  
4.2 Increased Accuracy of Phasor 
Measurement Units for Grid Control 
As a core part of the phasor measurement units, the data acquisition 
block in Figure 4 is specially designed to utilize the widely 
available GPS signal. As illustrated in Figure 7, it consists of four 
components: a BeagleBone black development board as the main 
processing unit, a GPS receiver providing the required time 
information and synchronization, a phase locked loop (PLL)  
tracked on the UTC time and producing the data sampling clock, 
and finally an analogue to digital converter digitalizing the input 
phasors.   
 
Figure 7: Data acquisition block structure  
The GPS receiver provides a pulse signal every second, which can 
be used to synchronize the start point for ADC sampling regardless 
of the local time. Then the PLL accepts the 1 pulse-per-second 
(PPS) signal, and generates a desired sampling clock for ADC. It 
should be noted that due to the relative low frequency of 1 PPS 
signal, it has a high requirement on the supporting circuits, which 
are carefully designed to satisfy the standards.  
The unique feature of BeagleBone Black with one ARM processor 
having two additional Programmable Real-time Units (PRU) inside 
makes it ideal for task of phasor measurements. It is designed that 
the main ARM CPU would be gathering sampled data in a higher 
interval (normally 10 ms) and pack it in one XML frame for the 
following signal processing block in Figure 4. The PRU acts as a 
middleware between ARM and ADC, by buffering the digital data 
from a high sampling rate of 12.8 kHz to a lower rate of 0.1 Hz.  
5. Conclusion 
This paper has presented a test-bed that enables the prototyping and 
validation of a several core features necessary for future smart grid 
systems. A full suite of technologies have been implemented, as 
necessary for provision of complete end-to-end smart grid real-time 
control strategies. The presented test-bed incorporates a number of 
novel features based around the modular design for phasor 
measurement, including state-of-the-art security mechanisms for 
secure communications across a wide area network.  A key benefit 
of the presented system is the ability to experiment with the full 
stack of functionality, spanning from the physical –electrical– 
layer, through standards compliant communications layers, right up 
to the application layer, where smart grid control functions can be 
implemented and tested. 
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